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Executive summary and key 
findings
 
Rural development in many fragile and conflict-
affected countries represents both a major 
challenge and an absolute must. The empirical 
evidence from five countries in South Asia, the 
Arabian Peninsula, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South America (Afghanistan, Nepal, Yemen, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Bolivia) 
presented in Study I shows the major challenges 
rural development encounters in fragile settings:  
 
 Extensive rural poverty is both related to 
(a) significant deficits in state authority, 
legitimacy and capacity, particularly in 
settings with violent conflict (and 
associated external interventions); and (b) 
persisting high levels of social inequality 
and ethnic cleavages in states where 
authority and capacity deficits are less 
pronounced. 
 
 Social inequalities between rural and urban 
areas are related to authority and and 
capacity deficits, including the absence of 
strong, consistent and legitimate political 
leadership, and an historical urban elite 
bias. 
 
 The provision of social welfare safety nets 
by non-state, traditional and customary 
organizations, including with respect to 
basic food security in rural areas, is related 
to state authority and capacity deficits, and 
deepens existing legitimacy deficits. 
 
 Particularly in fragile settings affected by 
violent conflict, deficits in state authority 
result in increased pauperization of rural 
populations due to the disruption of rural 
livelihoods and wage-labour migration. 
 
 Uncertain status of land tenure and land 
ownership in rural areas is related to, and 
compounded by, deficits in state authority 
and capacity. 
 
 Ineffective service delivery in rural areas is 
found in countries with both higher and 
lower deficits in state authority and 
capacity, and it undermines state 
legitimacy. 
 
 Higher levels of violence against women in 
rural areas are possibly related to deficits 
in state authority and capacity, particularly 
because of the absence or weakness of 
formal justice institutions and the 
prevalence of traditional and customary 
authorities. 
 
 Food insecurity in rural regions is 
significantly affected by state fragility.  
 
 Agricultural prices are subject to 
significant shocks which further 
exacerbates levels of rural food insecurity.  
 
 Livelihood diversification in the countries 
is key to household food security strategies 
either as a form of survival or as a strategy 
of accumulation and as the primary means 
of enhancing household safety nets; this 
diversification is often dependent on illicit 
economies. 
 
The present study (Study II) builds on these 
findings and draws insights from the analysis of 
five projects that were implemented in the 
sample countries in the period 2007-2012. The 
evidence allows for the construction of a 
cautiously optimistic narrative about rural 
development and food security interventions in 
fragile settings that may help policy-makers, 
both domestic and international, to fine-tune and 
adjust their future programming. Among the key 
factors that support positive results and outcomes 
of rural development and emergency 
interventions in fragile settings are: 
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 Substantial engagement and dialogue with 
local institutions and stakeholders, 
including traditional and customary ones, 
in project design and implementation;  
 
 Adopting a multi-level governance-
oriented approach that focuses on building 
and strengthening relationships between a 
broad range of local public and private 
actors and stakeholders at the different 
administrative levels rather than seeing the 
state, especially at the central level, as the 
principal agent and counterpart;  
 
 Going beyond ‘seed and tools’ 
interventions by adopting a governance-
oriented approach to rural development 
and addressing food insecurity; an 
agricultural-technologies-input-only 
approach is likely to simply consolidate 
existing relationships of power and 
patronage where benefits will be accrued 
and captured mainly by local elites; 
 
 Focusing interventions on the most 
vulnerable rural households, including 
those that form part of lower castes and 
indigenous peoples but also women and 
populations living in very remote areas;  
 
 Providing effective support for the 
diversification of the income of rural 
families, including importantly through 
off-farm labour;  
 
 In acute food insecurity and emergency 
situations ‘doing less and doing it quickly 
is doing more’ – transitioning more 
development-focused interventions to more 
narrowly oriented emergency and relief 
projects is possible and can be the right 
thing to do, particularly if emergency 
projects contribute to the achievement of 
food and livelihood benefits on which 
future non-emergency interventions can 
build;   
 
 Putting the emphasis on establishing the 
right type of communicative environment 
by fostering networks of dialogue and 
communication, strengthening 
participatory learning and using flexible 
project timescales;      
 
 
 Building on emerging political and social 
capital in rural areas to foster new forms of 
governance based on negotiated and 
consensual approaches, not top-down and 
in some situations militarized approaches; 
 
 Understanding the inter-relationships 
between, one the one hand, a sufficiently 
‘localized’, bottom-up approach to rural 
development that is capable of ‘working 
with the grain’ and is long-term, and the 
often unstable and conflict-ridden political 
and economic macro-context, which 
inevitably impacts on development 
prospects in rural areas of fragile states.  
 
It is paramount to recognize, however, that rural 
development in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings is eminently challenging and that there 
are a number of significant risks and no ‘silver 
bullets’.  
 
 The emphasis on ‘working with the grain’ 
and systematically engaging local 
institutions and stakeholders, including 
traditional and customary ones, carries the 
risk of solidifying exclusionary or 
predatory practices and structures in rural 
areas, particularly if the role of local state 
institutions is not well defined or they are 
not endowed with sufficient administrative 
and financial capacity.  
 
 If approaches to rural development become 
too ‘localized’ they are not able to address 
macro-level issues that can ultimately 
undermine their effectiveness.  
 
 Quickly switching to emergency 
programming may be the right thing to do 
when dealing with a food security crisis, 
for instance, but if this is not accompanied 
by a strategy to integrate emergency 
projects with development-oriented 
interventions once the crisis has subsided 
little will be achieved in terms of 
sustainability.  
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 In illicit drugs contexts (such as in the 
Chapare region of Bolivia) it appears to be 
highly advisable to abandon repressive, 
top-down approaches to coca crop control. 
But if the empowerment of farmers and 
their federations and the creation of a new 
form of negotiated and consensual 
governance are not accompanied by 
comprehensive development programs that 
are backed by the national government and 
international donors a huge opportunity for 
rural development will be lost.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction and methodology
 
 
Asking what works for rural development in 
fragile states and how rural development can 
contribute to mitigating fragility the research 
reviewed existing donor documents and 
academic and grey literatures on rural 
development programs in the sample countries 
covered in Study I: Afghanistan, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Yemen, Nepal and 
Bolivia. In consultation with our counterparts in 
GIZ we have chosen one project per country 
with the aim of covering a diverse range of 
scenarios, including food security and 
emergency projects and rural development in 
illicit drugs contexts, which would allow us to 
arrive at useful comparative conclusions. It 
should be noted that the selection of projects for 
this study was also guided in part by the 
availability of project assessments and 
evaluations, which at times was quite limited. 
While this study is a stand-alone piece of 
research, it may be useful to read it against the 
backdrop of Study I, which provides in-depth 
analyses of the negative effects of state fragility 
on rural development in the five sample 
countries.  
 
The projects analyzed in this study are:  
 
 Afghanistan: ‘Small Farmers Livelihoods 
and Income Enhancement in Baghlan 
Province’; funded by a trust fund set up by 
the Federal Republic of Germany within 
the UN’s Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO); implemented by the 
Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Livestock (MAIL) and FAO. 
 
 
 
 DRC: Entwicklungsfördernde und 
strukturbildende Übergangshilfe 
(ESÜH) project - ‘Reinstating and 
stabilising the livelihoods of refugees 
and the local population in the Uvira 
region; funded by BMZ 
(Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung - 
German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development); 
implemented by the Congolese 
government, GIZ and Christoffel-
Blindenmission. 
 
 Yemen: ‘Sustainable Food Security 
Programme in Yemen (SFSP)’; funded 
by BMZ; implemented by GIZ and the 
Hamburg-based GFA consulting firm. 
 
 Nepal: ‘Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Project I and II’; funded and 
implemented by the World Bank. 
 
 Bolivia: ‘Programa de apoyo al control 
social de la producción de hoja de coca’ 
(Support for Social Control of the 
Production of Coca Leaf Program, 
PACS); funded by the European 
Commission and the Bolivian 
Government; implemented by the 
Bolivian government together with the 
regional coca grower federations in the 
Chapare and Yungas de La Paz regions. 
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It is generally understood that effective rural 
development in fragile states and settings hinges 
on several factors, including: rural development 
programs and projects are multi-faceted/multi-
sectoral and concerned with developing effective 
partnerships between different economic and 
institutional actors at the local level; rural 
producers are empowered through the 
strengthening of community managed grass-
roots organizations, access to productive assets, 
and increases in technology and markets; and 
there are more effective, responsive and 
accountable service organizations established at 
the local/municipal level. The comparative 
analysis of the projects in the sample countries 
presented in this study helps to deepen our 
understanding of the key factors that play a role 
in achieving rural development goals in fragile 
states and settings, including with respect to 
strengthening rural livelihoods, increasing and 
diversifying rural income, and improving service 
delivery and food security. 
 
The research pays particular attention to the 
interaction between local and national 
governments, traditional and customary 
authorities and institutions, civil society (e.g. 
farmers associations and cocalero federations), 
the private sector and international donors in a 
number of rural development programs (and 
emergency/food security programs, where 
applicable) that have been in operation during 
the 2007-2012 research period. Inevitably, 
problems of attribution exist in terms of 
discerning the level of success of a particular 
program, i.e. issues of causality and program 
intervention are unavoidably problematic. 
Consequently, the research attempts to provide 
contextualized and detailed assessments of the 
chosen interventions by drawing on existing 
project evaluation reports and a broad range of 
academic and policy documents. In addition, for 
the cases of Yemen and Bolivia the research 
team contacted experts who had been involved in 
design and implementation of the food security 
project (Yemen) and the social control of coca 
crops project (Bolivia) to obtain further insights. 
The analysis had to partly concentrate on the 
uptake of programs where outcome data did not 
exist. 
 
2. Rural development in fragile 
settings: what works and why 
 
2.1. Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan has faced enormous political, 
security and development challenges for more 
than thirty years. With varying intensity over 
time and across the national territory, the country 
has had to wrestle with long spells of internal 
armed conflict and insurgency, a large foreign 
military presence, high levels of poverty, 
deprivation and food insecurity, a large and 
growing illicit opium and informal economy, and 
severe difficulties to build a functioning modern 
state capable of exercising the monopoly of 
force, protecting the fundamental rights of 
Afghan citizens and providing them with basic 
public services and goods. At the same time, 
common people, a majority of which live in rural 
areas, have developed coping strategies to 
survive under harsh conditions and sought to 
maintain their livelihoods at the local level. As 
Adam Pain and Jacky Sutton put it, ‘significant  
 
 
 
economic and social change that [relates] to the 
mobilization and consolidation of ethnic and 
regional identities, regional [and local] 
economies, the development of shadow and 
informal economies – of which opium poppy is 
but one aspect – and deep and unresolved 
conflicts at multiple levels over resources and 
identities [has] ... [been a] key [facet] of 
contemporary Afghanistan’ (Pain and Sutton 
2007:2).  
 
In this process, local and regional informal, 
traditional and customary institutions and 
networks have not disappeared but rather have 
become more consolidated, particularly in rural 
areas, contributing to absorbing the shocks 
generated by violence, conflict and the counter-
insurgency and counter-narcotics strategies of 
the central government in Kabul and outside 
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military intervention forces (e.g. ISAF). The 
downside has been that ‘substantial regional 
seats of power ... supported by political factions 
[remained] armed and outside of the orbit of 
Kabul’s influence. In addition, the Coalition 
operations against Taliban and al-Quaeda, and 
the tactics involved, including the funding of 
regional commanders, have contributed to ... 
instability’ (Pain 2007:20). 
 
80 per cent of Afghanistan’s population live in 
rural areas and agriculture ‘sustains more than 
half its gross domestic product’ (Torell and Ward 
2010:615).1 Agriculture has therefore been 
singled out as a key sector for government policy 
and international donor assistance (Pain and 
Sutton 2007: 172). ‘Interventions in the 1990s 
largely focused on increasing production, with 
little attention paid to rural livelihoods. 
Programmes were characterized by a monotony 
of interventions around seed, fruit trees and other 
inputs based on untested assumptions of 
production effects. The post-2001 period [i.e. 
after the ouster of the Taliban regime] saw the 
implementation of a classic emergency support 
programme with its emphasis on seeds and 
inputs’ (Pain and Sutton 2007: 6).  
 
In more recent years, which roughly fall within 
our study period (2007-2012), there appears to 
be a more widespread recognition among the 
Afghan government and international donors that 
the ‘seed and tools’ interventions, which have 
critically been labelled ‘the treadmill’ (Pain and 
Sutton 2007:174), have been of limited 
effectiveness with respect to reducing rural 
poverty and food insecurity. The long-standing 
assumption that agricultural production increases 
have a direct, positive impact on the livelihoods 
of rural populations has been questioned by 
studies that ‘have shown that this is not 
necessarily true, particularly where local, 
entrenched power structures have found ways of 
gaining control of surpluses’ (Pain and Sutton 
2007: 166).  
 
Consequently, more attention has begun to be 
paid to ‘linking relief, [agricultural] 
rehabilitation and development through 
agricultural interventions [which] can best be 
enhanced by focusing on building up the 
capacities of, and relations between, key 
                                               
1
 This estimate does not include the illicit opium poppy 
economy, which, if included, would significantly increase the 
contribution of agriculture to Afghanistan’s gross domestic 
product.  
institutions, particularly those providing, 
facilitating, regulating and demanding 
agricultural services’ (Pain and Sutton 
2007:186). At the heart of this rethinking of 
agricultural policy in Afghanistan is the 
recognition that local institutions matter and that 
many rural poor have no or only limited access 
to land and seek to sustain their livelihoods by 
diversifying income, especially through off-farm 
work. According to Jo Grace and Adam Pain, 
‘the majority of households have diversified 
income sources and many are involved in a 
combination of farm and non-farm work. ... Non-
farm labour is the most important source of 
income for poorer wealth groups’ (Grace and 
Pain 2004: 47, 48). It is estimated that in the 
mid-2000s some 65 per cent of Afghan farming 
families were dependent on off-farm income 
(Pain and Sutton 2007: 171). 
 
However, as noted earlier, one has to be clear 
that in an unstable, fragile and conflict-ridden 
context as in Afghanistan local institutions, 
including traditional ones such as shuras and 
jirgas, can both enable and hinder rural 
development. While working with and through 
local institutions and networks can to a degree 
compensate for the patent limitations of the 
formal Afghan state, it is important to critically 
interrogate the view that on their own they can 
provide the institutional infrastructure that will 
support rural development. In this vein, Pain and 
Sutton point out that ‘there is little indication that 
shuras are motivated by a genuine desire to 
engage in cooperative economic activities’ 
(2007: 182) and hence ‘the sustainability of 
shura-based community development must be 
questioned’ (2007: 181). Yet due to the 
weakness of the Afghan state it has to be 
recognized that the government and international 
donors do not have much of a choice than to 
work with local institutions. Recognition of this 
is reflected in the fact that the flagship program 
for strengthening local governance and 
supporting development in rural areas of the 
government of President Hamid Karzai (2004 to 
present) and the international donor community 
in Afghanistan, the National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP), has focused on establishing 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) in 
some 30,000 villages and rural settlements 
across the country.  
 
In 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United 
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Nations (FAO) jointly started implementing the 
36-month project ‘Small Farmers Livelihoods 
and Income Enhancement in Baghlan Province’ 
(SFL), funded by a trust fund the Federal 
Republic of Germany set up within FAO. The 
project had a budget of just over US$2 million 
and reflected a shift in emphasis from emergency 
to development interventions, with a continued 
emphasis on food security (SFL Final Evaluation 
Report 2013: 10) The project, which reached 
completion in 2012, aimed to promote income 
enhancement for small farmers in the Baghlan 
province (250 kilometres north of Kabul) 
through improved farmer’s organization, value 
addition and market linkage development. It 
built on lessons learned in the region during the 
implementation of a previous project also funded 
by Germany (‘Rehabilitation of the Sugar 
Industry in Baghlan: Technical and Managerial 
Support for Small Family Farmer Participation in 
the Sugar Beet Supply Chain’) and the 
experiences of FAO in the implementation of 
livelihoods diversification and enterprise 
development projects in Afghanistan. Following 
a two-pronged strategy, the project focused on 
(a) strengthening farm based organizations 
(FBOs); and (b) the promotion of value chain 
integration as a means to enhance production and 
marketing skills, promote enterprise 
diversification, develop opportunities for value 
addition and boost the income of some 2,000 
farm families (FAO, Project Document 2008: 1). 
 
We have chosen this particular project because in 
our view it reflects the above-mentioned shift in 
approach to supporting agriculture and rural 
development in Afghanistan by focusing on 
strengthening organizational, managerial and 
institutional capacity among poor rural 
communities and promoting increased farmer 
value addition and access to markets. The project 
reached beyond previous ‘seed and tools 
approaches’ for it was geared toward ‘local 
organization strengthening – as a crucial turn-
key for improving livelihoods of the rural poor. 
... The project recognizes that farmers do not act 
alone ... and will work to bind [farmers and 
FBOs, various local government departments, 
NGOs and private sector service providers] into 
locally-based working partnerships directed at 
collectively identifying problems and developing 
and implementing solutions’ (FAO, Project 
Document  2008:5). In addition, the project 
explicitly sought to support the diversification of 
rural livelihood options by promoting a range of 
cash crops and new products, thereby seeking to 
increase the income and food security of small 
farmers.  
 
Assessing the effects of SFL on rural 
livelihoods of small farmer families in 
Baghlan province  
 
According to the final evaluation report (SFL 
Final Evaluation Report 2013), the project 
appears to have had a positive effect on 
improving the food security and livelihoods of 
small farmers who are members of the 30 
cooperatives (FBOs) with which the project 
worked (ibid: 11). The heads of the cooperatives, 
which were surveyed as part of the evaluation, 
reported substantial increases in average general 
income of the cooperative farmers due to the 
project interventions (ibid: 38). It appears that 
improved household food security was achieved 
in two ways: through a greater variety of 
nutritious food produced and consumed by farm 
families; and through an increase in income from 
selling farm products promoted by the project. 
Increasing income for cooperative members may 
also have been related to better marketing and 
higher product prices (ibid: 39).  
 
Supported by the project, many farmers practised 
the recommended inter-cropping in their 
orchards for the first time ever. The resulting 
diversification of agricultural production has had 
a positive effect on the livelihood of farmers, 
who could compensate a poor harvest of one 
agricultural product with a good harvest of 
another. Further, farmers saw value-added 
production in the form of dried or processed fruit 
and vegetables as contributing to improving their 
income and livelihoods. It is expected that the 
600 orchards that were supported by the project 
will have a significant positive effect on the lives 
of the project beneficiaries once the fruit trees 
reach full production stage. It is likely that this 
will further boost value-added production (ibid: 
39). Further, the project contributed to 
strengthening human resource capacities in the 
provincial branch of the ministry (MAIL) and the 
boards of the cooperatives, as well as the 
technical knowledge and skills among the better 
equipped farmers (ibid: 37). Originally, it was 
foreseen that the project would support 2,000 
farmer families, but ultimately a larger number 
of them benefitted from the intervention (more 
than 3,200 cooperative members received direct 
inputs, though some 20 per cent of the whole 
membership of the 30 targeted cooperatives did 
not receive any inputs) (ibid:11). 
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However, there were also several project 
dimensions and goals that could not be achieved. 
Significantly, while many individual farmer 
families benefitted from increased cash income 
from diversified agricultural activities and 
products – among them the families of the heads 
of the cooperatives - the cooperatives themselves 
could not be strengthened. The evaluation 
revealed that ‘the objective of self-reliant 
cooperatives mentioned in the Project document 
does not seem to have been achieved’ (ibid: 37). 
The cooperatives’ role remained limited to that 
of a distributor of externally donated inputs 
among parts of the organizations’ members, but 
not all of them. ‘There are hardly any joint 
economic activities of the cooperatives as such, 
and the social cohesion of cooperative members 
does not seem to be particularly strong’ (ibid: 
37). Joint cooperative member planning, 
organization, coordination and control appear not 
to have been enhanced. The provision of 
financial services to cooperative members, such 
as in accessing loans from banks and other 
lending institutions or using cooperative capital 
for on-lending to members, was absent (ibid: 
24). It appears that these difficulties with respect 
to strengthening FBOs in Baghlan and getting 
them to work for all cooperative members were 
related to the election to the board of the 
cooperatives, which was perceived by some 
members as ‘only a symbolic act’ (ibid: 24). 
Farmers remained under the ‘influence of ex-
warlords and traditional leaders (‘maleks’ and 
‘qomandan’) and most of these just [pursued] 
their own interests’ (ibid: 24), dominating 
cooperative decision-making and the allocation 
of donor funds.  
 
Explaining advances in, and limitations of, 
livelihood support in Baghlan 
 
The achievements of the SFL project in Bahglan 
can be explained by pointing to several factors 
that were specific to the context and likely quite 
different and more enabling than in other areas 
of Afghanistan. To begin with, while Baghlan 
province has experienced security problems 
related to the armed conflict, this has been on a 
smaller scale than in other regions of the country 
(especially in the south and south-east). The 
province is partially also quite well connected by 
road to Kabul and the main regional and national 
market places, which is not the case in a number 
of other provinces. Further, Baghlan has a 
history of farmers’ associations for there used to 
be cooperatives and organizations of milk 
producers along collection chains in the 
province. ‘Today many farmers still have a sense 
of institutional membership although most of the 
institutions have been inactive for many years. 
New informal groups are emerging as a result of 
NGO activities. Though they are informal, these 
arrangements provide a form of self-help 
organizations. Seed bank associations and other 
groups formed during the humanitarian relief 
period [in the 1990s and early 2000s] have 
almost completely been handed over to 
Community Development Councils’ (SFL Final 
Evaluation Report 2013:3). There have also been 
previous international aid projects in the 
province that supported income diversification 
and livelihood strengthening, such as the above-
mentioned Rehabilitation of the Sugar Industry 
in Baghlan project. In short, Baghlan has 
benefitted from relative security, relatively good 
infrastructure connections, foreign development 
assistance and social capital, which taken 
together appears to have provided an enabling 
environment for rural development interventions 
such as the SFL project.  
 
Beyond the specific characteristics of this 
enabling environment, the project’s focus on 
promoting a greater variety of nutritious food 
produced and consumed by farm families and 
increasing family income through the better 
marketing of farm products, i.e. a focus on 
diversifying agricultural production and 
improving agricultural services, seems on the 
whole to have had a positive effect on farmer’s 
livelihoods and food security. Hence, the 
available evidence indicates that going beyond 
‘seeds and tools’ by strengthening human 
resource capacity and technical knowledge and 
skills among farmers, and improving market 
access can explain the project’s relative success.     
 
At the same time, it is important to recognize 
that essential components of the SFL project, 
particularly with respect to strengthening local 
governance for enhancing rural livelihoods and 
increasing food security could not be achieved. 
This observation goes back to the point made 
earlier about the difficulties of ‘enlisting’ local 
institutions in a rural development effort in a 
fragile and unstable context, such as in 
Afghanistan. There the ‘modern’ state’s reach 
across the national territory is severely limited 
(due to a number of factors related to limitations 
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of state capacity, authority and legitimacy)2 and 
it therefore becomes crucial for the state (and 
international donors) to work with local 
institutions for there is no ready alternative. This 
relationship, however, is fraught with problems 
and uncertainties. Informal, traditional and 
customary powerholders, which may include 
militia commanders and war lords, can exercise 
relatively unchecked control in local affairs, as 
has been pointed out by some cooperative 
members in Baghlan. While a key component of 
the ‘modern’ Afghan state’s effort to establish 
accountable and more effective local governance 
and development institutions in Afghanistan’s 
rural areas, the CDCs have also been impacted 
by local power relations, resulting at times in 
their ‘capture’ and at other times in the sidelining 
or overriding of established traditional and 
customary governance structures. It is unclear 
how the farmer cooperatives in Baghlan province 
and their boards relate to the CDCs in the region.   
     
2.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
As Study I indicated, “the proportion of the 
population [currently] living on less than one 
dollar per day is 70%” (IMF 2013: 370), with a 
definite rural-urban disparity to this. In the DRC 
an average of seven out of ten households are 
categorised as poor whereas eight out of ten rural 
households are poor, with seven out of ten 
households poor in urban areas (ibid.:14). Food 
makes up 62.3% of the expenditure of Congolese 
households (ibid: 25) with the ratio of “children 
under five who are moderately underweight 
decreasing from 31.1% in 2001 to 25.1% in 2007 
and 24% in 2010” (ibid: 28). However, this 
average disguises inequalities both in terms of 
areas of residence (27% in rural areas and 17% 
in urban areas) and provinces (ibid: 28).  
 
It is also clear that conflict has exacerbated food 
insecurity in the DRC, where the incidence of 
people in acute food insecurity was calculated at 
about 6.4 million in June 2013, showing an 
increase of about 75,000 people compared to 
October 2012 (FAO 2013: 1). Of these “two-
thirds […] (about 4.2 million persons) are 
considered severely food insecure and are mostly 
concentrated in Northern Kivu province in the 
east and in Katanga province in the south, where 
the escalation of civil conflict in recent months 
                                               
2
 For more detail on state fragility in Afghanistan and in rural 
areas in particular see Study 1. 
severely damaged livelihood systems and caused 
massive displacement” (ibid.) 
 
Given the high levels of conflict and food 
insecurity this study chose a 
Entwicklungsfördernde und strukturbildende 
Übergangshilfe (ESÜH) project - ‘Reinstating 
and stabilising the livelihoods of refugees and 
the local population in the Uvira region’ - as a 
suitable vehicle through which to discuss to what 
degree different forms of, and approaches to, 
rural development work in fragile states. The 
project’s area of intervention is the Uvira region 
in the eastern province of South Kivu. Its 
implementation started in October 2009 and is 
scheduled to end in December 2013. The project 
has been implemented jointly by GIZ, together 
with institutions from the DRC (IPAPEL 
(Inspection Provinciale de l’Agriculture, la 
Pêche et l’Elevage), SENASEM (Service 
National des Semences), INERA (Institut 
National d’Etudes et de Recherches 
Agronomiques), REMSU (Réseaux des 
multiplicateurs de semence à Uvira) and 
Ministère du Plan) and the International NGO 
Christoffel-Blindenmission (CBM) Germany, 
which have a reputation for their work with 
handicapped people. The total contract volume is 
EUR 4.52 million. 
 
The central goal of the project is to improve the 
productive base of Uvira, integrating different 
social groups in a peaceful way through a 
participatory approach at the community/village 
level (GIZ 2013). 
 
The project’s specific targets were: 
  
 To support 60% of its participants in 
increasing their income by up to 25% 
through agricultural activities and 
increased production. 
 
 To apply improved agricultural production 
and management techniques for 40% of the 
farmer associations and the state service 
providers.  
 
 To confirm for at least 40% of the 
population (residents and returnees) that 
there have been improvements in social 
cohesion in the communities. 
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 To have 40% of handicapped people that 
took part in project activities increase their 
participation in the peace process. 
 
The rationale of the project is based on key 
underlying assumptions. Namely, that the DRC 
has seen armed conflicts for several decades, 
mostly concerned with struggles over natural 
resources; consequently, productive 
infrastructure and local and regional economic 
cycles have been destroyed and the social 
cohesion of the population weakened due to 
migrant flows, refugees, and threats by rebels, 
the police and the army. The abundance of those 
natural resources are, in turn, the key to 
enhanced agricultural productivity and 
subsequent stability.   
 
While the repatriations of internally displaced 
people (IDPs) and refugees have mostly been 
completed (with the support of UNHCR and 
BMZ), the challenges of integrating the different 
groups in a peaceful manner and to revive the 
local economy and production cycles remain 
paramount. 
 
Moreover, despite the positive natural resource 
scenario food security is threatened. As with 
many parts of the DRC the Uvira region shows 
significant increases in hunger and malnutrition, 
with access to adequate and diversified nutrition 
very limited for all vulnerable groups; manioc 
consumption often remains the only food source 
for many people. In addition, regional supplies 
of good quality seeds are sparse and there is a 
strong need for improved supply as well as 
improvements in agricultural techniques so that 
agricultural production is sustainable. 
 
Assessing the effects of the ESÜH project on 
rural livelihoods, food security and social 
cohesion in Uvira 
 
During the period of the project 22,000 people in 
the territory of Uvira were reached (11,660 
women and 10,340 men), and there were 6,275 
people that directly benefitted from the seed 
multipliers that were organized in 124 different 
production associations (GIZ 2013). 
 
Assessments of project performance state a 
number of achievements. Firstly, seed 
multipliers increased household incomes by 
US$12 (i.e. 21%) in 2011, with poor rural 
households doing so by US$22 (i.e.39%). 
Consequently, school fees could be paid, health 
services could be used and houses could be 
renovated. For the ESÜH-project, this meant the 
successful achievement of a stated target of 60% 
of the supported men and women having 
increased their income by up to 25% through 
agricultural activities and increased production. 
However, it is not clear what is meant by ‘poor’ 
households in these instances. 
 
Secondly, the project set a target of at least 40% 
of the farmer associations and the state service 
providers applying improved agricultural 
production and management techniques. Project 
data suggests rural households have increased 
the application of increased agricultural 
techniques from 12% in 2010 to 50% in 2012, 
with households now eating more meals per day 
with a wider range of foods on offer. Seed 
providers now function relatively well in a 
decentralized manner and are ‘close’ to the 
population. 
 
Thirdly, the project also set a target of at least 
40% of the population (residents and returnees) 
estimating that social cohesion in the 
communities was positive by the end of the 
project. In the project’s view this goal has been 
partially reached though this has not yet been 
sufficiently quantified. However, it appears that 
parties previously in conflict are now 
undertaking activities together. Finally, the 
project set a target of 40% of handicapped 
people who partook in project activities to 
consequently increase their participation in the 
peace process. However, actual progress has not 
been measured at present.  
 
Explaining advances and limitations of the 
ESÜH project  
 
The most recent Control Mission documents 
emphasize the use of existing agricultural 
potential as key to its achievements, essentially 
through the improvement of seed supply. This 
was strengthened through the inclusion of all 
relevant stakeholders from government and civil 
society, which linked producers, consumers and 
governmental control organisms (Service 
National des Semences, SENASEM) with 
extension/advisory institutions (Inspection 
Provinciale de l’Agriculture, la Pêche et 
l’Elevage, IPAPEL). Also important was the 
targeting of seed supplies to the most vulnerable 
households, including former returnee families 
and refugees and female-headed households, 
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together with their inclusion in local farmer 
associations, that made it easier to rent land. 
 
It is clear that the marketing of agricultural 
products supported by the project still lag behind 
other project targets. Furthermore, the project 
does acknowledge that the difficult conflict 
environment in which it has been operating has 
meant that the necessary time for the specific 
activities was underestimated, stating that the 
implementation of project activities required a 
comprehensive analysis of the interests and local 
conflict areas close to the project, and of the 
potential risks to implementation. The “do no 
harm” approach that attempted to include all 
groups was not always consistently followed. 
The three year time frame was seen as being far 
too short for implementing the proposed 
activities. Moreover, the population of Uvira was 
often seen as having an understandable ‘take 
mentality’ as is often the case in humanitarian 
crisis contexts. It was further acknowledged that 
the project did not consistently foster capacities 
to counter this mentality, through developing 
more capacity for self-organization. Only since 
2010, with advice from PAD (an NGO), did the 
project react to this necessity and alliances were 
built in a conflict-sensitive way between the 
state, civil society and seed producers. 
 
It is also evident that a coherent understanding of 
social cohesion was needed by the project at both 
the planning and inception stages. Given the 
nature of tribal chieftainship control over land 
interests this need seems paramount in order to 
assess potential risks. In turn, this would have to 
be supported by the continuous management of 
interest groups, negotiation and meaningful 
feedback processes at the community level. 
Moreover, the Control Mission found that short 
and long-term approaches in ESÜH-projects 
should parallel and connect with one another so 
that, on the one hand, the urgent needs of 
vulnerable groups can be addressed quickly (e.g. 
through the egalitarian distribution of the means 
of production) and, on the other hand, local 
structures (state services, seed controlling 
authority, local administration) that serve as 
service providers in the long term can be built 
(GIZ 2013). 
 
2.3 Yemen 
 
Yemen is the only nation in the Arab world 
classified as a least developed country (Republic 
of Yemen/MOPIC 2010: 7). Due to high 
population growth, acute shortage of arable and 
irrigated land and an over-reliance on revenues 
from oil the country has been heavily affected by 
food insecurity and malnutrition. According to a 
recent study by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI), ‘Yemen’s food 
insecurity is alarming and extremely alarming at 
macro- and micro-levels, respectively’ (Maystadt 
et al. 2012:14). Currently ranked as the 11th most 
food-insecure country in the world with one in 
three Yemenis suffering from acute hunger, the 
country is a net importer of food commodities 
(more than 75% of the consumed basic food 
staples, such as cereals, are imported). In the 
period 2001-2007, Yemen’s annual food import 
bill increased from US$104 million to US$ 600 
million (EU 2009b:1); in 2000, the country used 
10% of its export earnings to import food, which 
rose to 25% by 2007 (IFPRI 2011:2).  
 
Chronic food insecurity severely affects children 
under the age of five, ‘with 53% of stunting 
(chronic malnutrition), 12% of wasting (acute 
malnutrition) and 46% of underweight’ (EU 
2009a:1). ‘The problem is magnified in rural 
areas, where 37 percent of the population is food 
insecure, compared with 18 percent in urban 
areas. Of Yemen’s 7.5 million food insecure 
people, 6.4 million live in rural areas. Rural food 
insecurity is highest among non-farm 
households, which are home to more than half of 
Yemen’s food insecure. The proportion of food-
insecure people in rural areas is lowest for farm 
households, but it is still more than 10 
percentage points higher than that of the urban 
population (IFPRI 2011:2).  
 
Food insecurity has also been identified as a 
significant driver of violent conflict in Yemen, as 
well as other Arab countries (Maystadt et al. 
2012). Preceded by riots in southern parts of 
Yemen that were triggered by large global food 
price hikes in 2007-2008, violence became more 
acute in 2011-2012, when the ‘Arab Spring’ 
protests reached Yemen. ‘The nature of violence 
in Yemen has changed between 2005 and 2011 
from being ethnically and religiously based to 
being dominated by the effects of increases in 
food process on an impoverished population’ 
(Gros et al. 2012:2). Though the protests 
ultimately forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
who had been in power since 1990, to resign 
from office, the patronage-based, rather 
informal-traditional and malleable nature of the 
political regime and state he created has 
remained essentially unchanged.
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Tackling the severe problem of food insecurity – 
and by implication the risk of further outbreaks 
of violence and political instability - has become 
a priority of the Yemeni government and 
international donors. The European Union and 
other international donors foresee major threats 
to the country’s food security in the medium to 
long term. With international support (offered by 
the EU, GIZ, the World Bank and IFPRI), the 
government of Yemen has drawn up a National 
Food Security Strategy (NFSS), the 
implementation of which, however, is witnessing 
a slow start and there appears to be limited 
commitment to the strategy among some 
government and state sectors (GFA 2013). The 
NFSS contains a 7-point action plan, comprising: 
reforming petroleum subsidies; improving the 
business climate; reducing qat production and 
consumption; improving food security risk 
management; implementing the water-sector 
strategy; targeting public investment and 
improving service provision; and launching 
high-level awareness campaigns (IFPRI 2011).  
 
Alongside other donors, Germany has supported 
efforts to increase food security in Yemen. In 
2008, GIZ was commissioned by BMZ to 
implement the 4-year, EUR 7 million 
‘Sustainable Food Security Programme in 
Yemen (SFSP)’. We have chosen this program 
as our Yemen case study for addressing the issue 
of ‘what works for rural development in fragile 
settings’ because it is an interesting example of 
an intervention in fragile and highly food-
insecure rural contexts that evolved from being 
development-focused to being emergency-
focused. SFSP was originally oriented toward 
tackling food insecurity in two pilot regions in 
the Al Hodeidah and Hadjja governorates 
through measures focused on strengthening 
national food security policy capacity, and 
increasing food production and awareness about 
the negative consequences of qat consumption in 
the target regions, with an additional ‘emergency 
funding’ component bolted on in 2010 (the funds 
for which - EUR 2.5 million - were drawn from a 
separate budget line) (GIZ 2011). Overtaken by 
the events in Yemen during the ‘Arab Spring’ in 
2011, program activities were reduced to a 
minimum, with the program being redesigned for 
a second phase in 2012 focusing primarily on 
emergency cash-for-work (CFW) interventions 
in Al Hodeidah governorate.  
 
 
‘The first 34 months of programming were 
‘developmental’ in focus, and the next 14 were 
more of ‘short-term emergency type response to 
food insecurity’ (GFA 2001a:3). That shift was a 
consequence to the Yemen uprising and 
subsequent political and economic crisis that had 
seriously curtailed Yemen’s economy, and had 
stretched the daily food security of vulnerable 
and food-poor households’ (GFA 2001a:3). The 
first phase of SFSP was implemented on the 
Yemeni side by the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation (MOPIC) and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI) and 
on the German side by GIZ, which subcontracted 
a substantial part of the German contribution to 
GFA, a German consulting company. As 
mentioned earlier, the program had three core 
components/objectives, not counting the added 
on ‘emergency funding for 2010’: 1) MOPIC is 
enabled to coordinate the development and 
implementation of a new food security strategy 
(the above-mentioned NFSS); 2) the production 
of food is increased; and 3) the local population 
is aware of the negative consequences of qat 
consumption (GIZ 2011:7). 
 
‘During the [second phase], SFSP designed and 
implemented 5 Cash-for-Work (CFW) measures 
and 1 seeds assistance measure. The central 
reason was to improve poor people’s access to 
affordable food through CFW-based cash-
transfer strategy, and assist subsistence farmers 
with staple seeds to increase food production 
from their lands, respectively. The CFW 
measures were designed in such a way to build 
assets to serve communities’ food and livelihood 
needs in the long term also’ (GFA 2012a:3). All 
measures during the second phase were executed 
through GIZ ‘Direct Community Contracting’ 
procedures, and as such did not formally involve 
the ministries at the central government level.          
 
The available (and relatively sparse) program 
documentation and additional information 
obtained in an interview with a member of staff 
of the German implementing agency (GFA) 
provide some insights into why the first, more 
development-focused phase of the program 
appears to have been more of a challenge than 
the second, CFW-focused intervention. It should 
be noted, though, that output, outcome and 
impact data for the first phase were not available 
as we only had access to the report of a mid-term 
review conducted in early 2011 (GIZ 2011). Our 
reading of this report is that it focuses more on 
issues in relation to the theory of change and the 
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overall design of the program, and not on actual 
outputs and outcomes. For the second phase, 
there is some output data available but it is quite 
limited. This notwithstanding, we believe it is 
possible to make some comparative observations 
about what works and what does not work for 
food security interventions in fragile rural 
contexts.  
 
Let us now turn first to what appears to have 
been the effect of the second, ‘emergency’ phase 
of SFSP on food security and rural livelihoods in 
Al Hodeidah governorate. Subsequently, we take 
a closer look at the factors that played an 
enabling role for the CFW interventions and 
those that made the more complex, development-
oriented interventions in the first phase a more 
challenging undertaking.    
 
Assessing the effects of the second, 
‘emergency’ phase of SFSP on food security 
and rural livelihoods in the governorate of Al 
Hodeidah  
 
According to the available Final Progress Report 
(FPR 2012) and the report of an impact 
monitoring mission (GFA 2012b), both of 2012, 
the second, ‘emergency’ phase of SFSP has 
achieved producing ‘the deliverables that [it] was 
meant to – “put food into hungry stomachs”’ 
(GFA 2012a:3). A number of outputs are cited, 
ranging from how many CFW days were 
generated by the program to how many 
households secured daily food over a ten-month 
period and what percentage of cash resources 
were transferred to food-insecure beneficiaries of 
the program. The report of the IMM provides a 
number of additional statistics on the positive 
effects of SFSP on how, for instance, beneficiary 
households improved their daily diets, consumed 
more regular meals and were able to repay 
pending debts. Further, ‘most of the inputs - 
supplies, services, and technical expertise – were 
sourced from inside Hodeidah Governorate, in 
particular from the target districts themselves. 
For instance, (1) all of the labour, plants, fencing 
materials, and water for Madania sand dunes 
were localized, except the irrigation system 
which was procured from Hodeidah; (2) all of 
the stones, cement, sand, pebbles, and labour, for 
the two road projects and one irrigation canal 
were also sourced locally, including heavy 
machinery from the [Government of Yemen] 
Authorities of [the regional Tehama 
Development Authority, TDA] and [General 
Corporation for Roads and Bridges, GCRB] 
based in the districts’ (GFA 2012a:12). 
 
It appears that the CFW interventions also 
contributed to the achievement of longer-term 
food and livelihood benefits of local 
communities due to the rehabilitation of a road, 
an irrigation canal and the stabilization of sand 
dunes. ‘These assets have the ability to improve 
peoples’ access to markets and their participation 
in those markets, increase food production and 
stabilize local food markets, increase peoples’ 
access to education and information, reduce crop 
loss to wild sand storms, reduce health costs, and 
improve long-term health benefits’ (GFA 
2012a:3). In addition, the measures appear to 
have had a positive effect on reuniting a large 
number of families and rebuild community 
cohesion as ‘prior to CFW measures, members 
from these families had migrated outside in 
search of food and income, but they returned to 
join their families and participated in CFW 
measures to earn their food and income’ (GFA 
2012a:3). 
 
Explaining advances in, and limitations of, 
increasing food security and improving rural 
livelihoods in Al Hodeidah  
 
To begin with, it is important to be clear about 
the differences in design and objectives of the 
interventions under SFSP in the first and second 
phase. As outlined above, the first phase was 
more complex and ambitious than the second 
one. It attempted to combine a component 
focused on enhancing the capacity within the 
central government of Yemen to design and 
coordinate the implementation of the NFSS with 
support to improved and enhanced agricultural 
and food production in the target areas and a 
campaign to build awareness about the negative 
effects of qat production and consumption on the 
livelihoods and well-being of rural communities. 
Fundamentally, SFSP in its first phase was 
designed to work with and through two 
government ministries, MOPIC and MAI. This 
turned out to be challenging for the following 
reasons.  
 
Coordination and cooperation between SFSP and 
other international partners who were supporting 
MOPIC in the operationalization and 
institutionalization of the NFSS was limited, 
leading to information flow problems, the likely 
duplication of donor efforts and the 
overstretching of already weak human and 
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institutional capacities of the Yemeni sector 
ministries at the central and decentralized, 
governorate levels (GIZ 2011:11, 15). This 
situation appears to have been compounded by 
‘conflicting interests within [MOPIC which] 
prevented the definition of clear cut 
responsibilities and the establishment of a food 
security secretariat in the ministry’ (GIZ 
2011:18). These issues could also have been 
related to the fact that the development of the 
NFSS (with significant inputs from IFPRI) was 
‘rather donor-driven’ and the strategy was not 
widely disseminated, especially at the level of 
the governorates. Consequently, there was little 
recognition of local ownership of the NFSS 
among sectors of the Yemeni government at the 
central and governorate levels (GIZ 2011:16; 
GFA 2013).  
 
In addition, there were few incentives for 
ministry officials to cooperate fully with SFSP’s 
Program Management Unit in MOPIC for it was 
not clear what the benefits of such cooperation 
would be (GFA 2013). ‘The GFA team leader 
based in MOPIC had regular contact to part of 
the ministry’s management level but no 
permanent (full time) counterparts at the right 
working level. [...] Getting allocated a full time 
counterpart [...] seems to [have been] difficult 
[...] as ministries staff is not well paid and 
therefore not ready to engage in full time project 
activities without additional personal benefits’ 
(GIZ 2011:20). While there is less information 
available on components 2 and 3 of SFSP, it has 
been reported that cooperation between relevant 
partners and stakeholders across the different 
levels of government has also been challenging 
(GIZ 2011:14). Further, with respect to 
component 2 (‘increase in food production’) it 
turned out that the application and approval 
process for agricultural measures was time 
consuming, ‘especially [when] compared to 
similar measures under the “Emergency Funding 
2010”’ (GIZ 2011:23). 
 
In contrast to the first phase of SFSP, the CFW 
interventions during the second phase did not 
involve any formal cooperation between 
GIZ/GFA and the sector ministries of the 
Yemeni government. Rather the implementation 
modality was based on ‘direct community 
contracting’ and involved the creation of Social 
Development Committees (SDCs) in the target 
areas. It is noteworthy, however, that even 
though the central government was not the entry 
point for the program the German implementing 
agency, GFA, communicated and interacted with 
government counterparts in Sana’a on a regular, 
though informal basis, keeping them informed 
about the CFW activities that were being carried 
out (GFA 2013). It appears that this was done in 
recognition of the fact that in a context 
characterized by the existence of intricate 
patronage networks and a ‘parallel state’, such as 
in Yemen, ‘it is only possible to work in 
Hodeidah or any other region of the country if 
one has good personal contacts at the central 
government level’ (GFA 2013). 
 
The SDC’s were conceived as ‘single-purpose 
institutions’ (i.e. as implementing partners of the 
CFW activities) and created through local 
elections. GFA signed Local Subsidy Contracts 
with the SDCs. The available evidence suggests 
that membership of the SDCs was quite 
representative as they included local traditional 
and customary authorities and leaders, such as 
shaiks, and other community members with 
some level of schooling, ‘who are often more 
important and influential than the formal 
government institutions’ (GFA 2013).3 ‘SDCs 
were established through [a] democratic process 
[...] and then a series of capacity-and-institution 
building measures were planned and executed to 
strengthen their skills, knowledge and 
management abilities. Stakeholder coordination 
– between SFSP, SDCs and district authorities – 
was very intense and regular during the 10-
month implementation. SDCs [enjoyed] 
excellent rapport and relations with the district 
authorities’ (GFA 2012a:8). ‘As SDCs were 
constituted from inside the target communities, 
they had full knowledge of every household [...] 
and were able to identify the right households 
(against the selection criteria) to participate in 
the CFW’ (GFA 2012a:15).  
 
Essentially, the second phase of SFSP enabled 
the SDCs to purchase services from government 
institutions directly, which reflected more of a 
bottom-up than a top-down process and appears 
to have been quite effective. Local and regional 
government entities in the target areas in 
Hodeidah governorate had incentives to 
cooperate with the SDCs because they undertook 
work that was part of their own institutional 
mandate but for which they lacked the necessary 
funds. Further, some local officials were 
                                               
3
 However, it is unclear whether women were part of the 
SDCs and if so, what percentage of the SDC membership 
was female. 
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employed by GFA to participate in the CFW 
activities (GFA 2013). Among the issues that 
have been identified as needing more attention 
when working through community-based 
organizations, such as the SDCs, are adopting a 
more inclusive approach to ‘ensure proper 
coordination mechanisms during planning, 
implementation, and management because some 
members in the communities felt that they were 
left out of the process. This may lead to a loss of 
accountability and ownership [...], thereby 
threatening the [...] sustainability of [the 
achieved] impacts’; and improving coordination 
with other relevant stakeholders, especially the 
central government’s line ministries in the target 
region (GFA 2012b:13-14).     
 
In sum, the available evidence suggests that in 
the Yemeni context - characterized by a high 
degree of fragility of the formal state, which 
coexists alongside intricate patronage networks 
structured along ethnic, tribal, religious and 
political lines – it can be less of a challenge to 
tackle major problems such as chronic food 
insecurity by ‘working with the grain’ at the 
local level, rather than seeking to operate with 
and through the formal state apparatus. Of 
course, the big drawback is that such 
interventions are localised in nature and not 
designed to address macro-level issues (as 
outlined in the NFSS), and there are also serious 
questions about their sustainability. Further, it is 
unclear whether the relatively effective CFW 
measures can be linked to a broader and longer-
term rural development strategy and what form 
this should take. 
 
2.4 Nepal 
 
The decade-long violent conflict between the 
government of Nepal and a Maoist insurgency 
(1996-2006) ‘claimed around 13,000 lives and 
displaced more than 200,000 Nepalis, generating 
a range of negative impacts on people’s 
livelihoods in the process, including: declines in 
food production and food security; reductions in 
travel and the transport of goods; and destruction 
of local infrastructure.’ (ODI 2012: vii). For 
instance, public sector expenditures on major 
infrastructure and agriculture declined from 6.5 
percent of GDP in 1995 to 3.8 percent of GDP in 
2005 while expenses on defence and general 
public services rose from 2.4 percent of GDP in 
1995 to 4.0 percent of GDP in 2005 (ADB 2009: 
5). 
 
In 2006, large civil demonstrations forced a 
political change towards restoration of 
parliamentary rule, which had been suspended by 
the King a few years earlier, and a 
comprehensive peace agreement (ICAF 2011). 
This raised high expectations for the construction 
of better governance structures with enhanced 
public service provision. But progress of state-
building has been slow and numerous crucial 
elements of the peace process could not yet be 
implemented due to political turmoil and 
deadlock at the central government level. The 
establishment of a new, democratically-elected 
interim government took about two years. The 
adoption and promulgation of the new 
constitution is still pending.  
 
In the context of the absence of these necessary 
reforms, international donors have initiated 
several programmes to improve the situation for 
the population by implementing projects related 
to basic services such as health care, education as 
well as water and sanitation. Some progress has 
been made (ODI 2012). However, on the whole 
the quality of services across the country remains 
critically poor (DfID 2013) and the government 
has pledged to spend ‘at least 20% of its 
allocated budget on the basic services sector’ 
(ODI 2012: 29). 
 
The situation remains especially severe in remote 
and previously insecure rural areas in both the 
mountains and the mid-Western regions (ICG 
2008; ICAF 2011; DfID 2013). This is reflected 
in chronic poverty and low levels of educational 
attainment and employment. In rural areas 
chronic poverty is much higher than in urban 
ones (DfID 2013:6, 10). The poverty rates are 
correlated to educational attainment as well as 
employment status, suggesting that illiteracy and 
underemployment are severe in rural areas (DfID 
2013). There are also deeply rooted gender, caste 
and ethno-religious inequalities. Yet many 
formal and informal institutions and policies are 
stubbornly exclusionary and most demands of 
the excluded remain unmet (DFID and WB 
2010). 
 
A main challenge constitutes the persistent lack 
of safe drinking water and sanitation leaving 
especially the vulnerable and socially excluded 
in rural areas at high health risk. Around 20 
percent of the population in Nepal do not have 
access to safe drinking water and almost half of 
the population do not have access to proper 
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sanitation. ‘Every day 16 million Nepalis 
(around 57 percent of the population) practice 
open defecation because they have no toilets, and 
only 41 percent of public and community 
schools in Nepal have toilet facilities. Of those, 
only one in four has separate toilets for female 
students’ (OD, 2012: 36). Further the 
functionality of actual coverage is questionable. 
According to Devkota (2007) 92 percent of piped 
water supplies and 25 percent of tube wells are 
either out of operation or in need of repair and 
maintenance (ODI, 2012). This requires high 
investments by the government to restore and 
built up water and sanitation systems in order to 
minimise the health risk for citizens. 
 
Starting in 1996, the World Bank has supported 
government efforts to improve rural water supply 
and sanitation. The First Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Project initiated by the World Bank 
was implemented in the period 1996-2003 with a 
total budget of US$18.2 million (WB, 2013). 
This was followed by the Second Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project, which 
incorporated the successful features and 
experience of the first project. The second phase 
had a total budget of US$ 52.3 million and was 
finalized in August 2010.4 
 
The ‘Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Support 
Programme emphasizes the active participation 
of stakeholders at all levels to increase their 
feeling of ownership’ (Prasain 2003:120). The 
overall objective of the project was two-fold: ‘(i) 
to improve RWSS [rural water supply and 
sanitation] sector institutional performance and 
mainstream the Fund Board approach in the 
Government's system [...], and (ii) support 
communities to form inclusive local water 
supply and sanitation user groups that can plan, 
implement, and operate drinking water and 
sanitation infrastructure that delivers sustainable 
health, hygiene and productivity benefits to rural 
households [...]’ (WB 2013: 2). 
 
Both objectives are fully consistent with the 
goals of the government’s Rural Water Supply 
and Sanitation Sector Policy and Strategy of 
2004, which aims at developing a uniform 
demand-driven model for service delivery 
corresponding to affordability and willingness to 
pay. The policy also aims at harmonizing 
approaches of donors, as well as setting a sector-
                                               
4
 US$ 25.30 million was provided through credit lines and 
US$27 million as a scale up grant.  
wide minimum cost sharing norm of 20 percent 
capital contribution from the community.5 It also 
entails the establishment of the Fund Board6 as a 
regular sector institution through an act of 
parliament. The second Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation project paid particular attention to the 
inclusion of certain social groups, focusing in 
particular on the need and demand of lower 
caste, indigenous peoples, remote communities 
and women. Furthermore, the project improved 
on health and hygiene interventions by 
integrating hand washing, and other health and 
hygiene initiatives (WB 2013: 4).  
 
Assessing the effects of the Second Rural 
Water Supply and Sanitation project on rural 
development in the project areas 
 
According to the implementation completion and 
results report (2013), the project has had positive 
effects on improving rural water supply and 
sanitation of people in the project areas.7 In total 
1.14 million people benefited from improved 
access to safe drinking water supply. This 
includes 53 percent of beneficiaries from 
marginalised groups. The project had a high 
impact on the economic empowerment and 
health of beneficiaries. For instance, the 
improved access to water saved time which was 
normally spent on fetching water: ‘On average, 
households gained 2.1 hours per day as a result 
of not having to fetch water, and can now use the 
saved time for income-generating activities, self-
improvement activities and social activities’ 
(WB, 2013: 11). This has had a particularly 
positive effect on women’s income generating 
activities as they traditionally hold the primary 
responsibility for water provision and 
consumption at household level. ‘The percentage 
increase in the income of women who engaged 
                                               
5
 This could be reduced to 10 percent for the poor and 
disadvantaged groups (WB, 2013). 
6
 The Government of Nepal (GoN) established the Rural 
Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board in 
1996 to promote sustainable and cost effective demand-led 
rural water supply and sanitation. It operates through 
contracting local partners, so-called support organizations 
(SOs) including non-governmental and private organizations. 
The Board was institutionalised under a GoN Formation 
Order of the Development Board Act, which provided the 
necessary permanent legal status to the organization and was 
meant to ensure regular budget allocations and operational 
autonomy (WB, 2012). In practice this has not worked out 
very well for government budget allocations have been 
limited and most of the funds were provided by international 
donors. For more detail see below. 
7
 The project was implemented in numerous locations across 
Nepal. 
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in economic activities with the time saved stood 
at 24 percent’ (WB 2013: 11). The project had a 
number of important features that helped 
facilitate and incentivize women’s engagement 
in income-generating activities with the time 
saved, such as credit and savings facilities and a 
program for providing commercial credit 
facilities to women (WB 2013: 12,13). Other 
positive second order effects also indicate an 
increase in girls’ school attendance as well as 
better child nutrition as women started growing 
their own vegetables (WB 2013).8  
 
Furthermore, the prevalence of diarrheal disease 
among young children in the project area 
decreased from 78 to 14 percent. This indicated a 
positive impact on the health of beneficiaries. 
Especially women’s health (e.g. backache) was 
improved as the need to carry water over long 
distances was reduced. Further health benefits 
were achieved through the improvement of 
hygiene conditions by constructing sanitation 
facilities. This enhanced, for example, the 
practice of hand washing from 32 percent to 93 
percent. In total of 137,536 latrines were 
constructed benefiting 136,487 households in the 
project area, including 64,407 sanitary latrines 
funded. Raising awareness about hygiene and 
sanitation led to multiplier effects which resulted 
in the construction of an additional 72,080 
latrines by the communities using their own 
resources. Hence, in total about 83 percent of 
households in the project areas now have 
sanitary latrines against a national average of 36 
percent (WB 2013: 11).  
 
The project has also had some positive effects on 
the capacity of sector organisations and service 
providers at the central and local levels. At the 
local level, the project focused on awareness 
raising and capacity building of user groups. It  
was expected to have ’an important longer term 
impact on the ability of the communities to come 
together for collective action and take charge of 
improving their livelihoods’ (WB 2013: 13). At 
the central level, the sector ministry’s capacity to 
carry out sector-wide M&E, has been improved. 
The project also influenced the development of 
the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Sector 
Policy and Strategy of 2004, which establishes a 
common set of guidelines for all projects in the 
sector, and incorporates the main provisions of 
the Fund Board’s approach. Furthermore, ‘the 
Fund Board’s model has been scaled up as part 
                                               
8
 Anecdotal evidence from field visits (WB, 2013) 
of the project and has been substantially adopted 
by the DWSS (Department of Water Supply and 
Sewerage), DDCs (District Development 
Committees) and donors. Most RWSS (Rural 
Water Supply and Sanitation) providers now 
provide the basic service approach defined in the 
sector policy, including the formation of WSUCs 
(Water Supply and Sanitation Users Committee), 
and have adopted Fund Board’s guidelines. A 
few RWSS providers, especially from the public 
sector, have adopted full community 
empowerment and implementation’ (WB 2013: 
11).  
 
In sum, it appears that all project dimensions 
were achieved, although the implementation of 
the project was delayed significantly which led 
to the extension of the implementation period. 
This was mainly related to the violent insurgency 
which restricted the movement of people and 
hence material and goods. There were also 
strikes which delayed the transportation of non-
local material. Delays also concerned the 
approval time of the project schemes by the Fund 
Board. This was related to the political instability 
that persisted until 2009 and the government’s 
delay in appointing executive members to the 
Fund Board (WB 2013).  
 
Other limitations of the projects relate to the 
empowerment of the rural population (Sharma 
2001). While the project heavily focused on the 
implementation of the Fund Board approach with 
its main principle of active participation of 
stakeholders at all levels in order to increase 
ownership and sustainability of project efforts, 
the project did not pay enough attention to 
enhancing the institutional capacity and 
responsibility of local government. Only a few 
trainings took place in support of local 
government. A lack of engagement and advocacy 
towards devolution made rural development on 
the whole more difficult (Prasain 2003:116). The 
role of the beneficiaries in decision-making has 
remained limited to the operation and 
maintenance of water and sanitation facilities. 
Despite formal institutional changes such as the 
set up of the Fund Board, real empowerment of 
the people in rural areas remains challenged by 
the lack of decentralisation (ICG 2011). 
Furthermore, there are limitations with regard to 
the sustainability of the Fund Board as its 
functioning is dependent on the appropriate 
budget allocations. The government merely 
funds a small amount of the Fund Board’s 
budget, while the bigger share relies on the 
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support provided by international donors. This 
raises questions of ownership and the national 
political interest in supporting public services in 
rural areas. 
 
Explaining advances in, and limitations of, 
rural water and sanitation interventions in 
Nepal 
 
The project adopts a ‘learning process approach’ 
(Korten 1980) and incorporates three main 
success factors: community orientation; long-
term engagement; and learning circles. The 
project design accounts for community 
participation and community-based 
implementation as well as service delivery based 
on demand as key principles of the Fund Board 
approach. This accounts as key feature for 
withstanding the implementation challenges of 
operating in a conflict environment. ‘Even at the 
height of the insurgency, when most of the donor  
programs stopped or had to be significantly 
reduced, implementation under the project 
continued without interruption’ (WB 2013: 16). 
 
The project duration encompasses different 
political situations such as violent conflict and 
post-conflict instability. The first project was 
initiated in 1996 and can be described as 
development phase. This was followed by the 
second rural water and sanitation project. As 
mentioned above, due to the political instability 
and violent context however ‘some delay in 
project implementation occurred because of the 
unstable political and security situation of the 
country, delay in the nomination of board 
members by the Fund Board resulting into late 
selection of the support organizations (SOs), 
such as local NGOs and private sector firms, and 
delay in scheme selection finalization, while cost 
overruns in the project occurred because of 
increased market price of the non-local 
materials.’ (WB 2013: 37). Therefore the project 
received additional financing and the scope of 
the project was restructured with a new and 
higher target. The project was extended two 
times and was finalised in August 2010.  
 
The implementation of two subsequent rural 
water and sanitation projects has provided 
continuous and long-term support for the sector. 
Furthermore, it offered the opportunity to learn 
from earlier experiences and improve the project. 
‘The RWSSP II, as a follow-on project, was able 
not only to address the implementation issues 
which affected the first project, but also to 
experiment and pilot innovations. These 
innovations allowed the RWSS program to grow 
and evolve, and could not have been introduced 
under the first project, which focused on 
developing the foundations of the Fund Board’s 
delivery model’ (WB 2013: 16). 
 
In sum, the learning process approach, which 
underpinned the project design, addressed some 
of the problems and limitations mentioned 
earlier. For instance, project delays were 
addressed by a certain degree of flexibility with 
regard to the time frame and funding modalities. 
The approach also supported community 
empowerment from a bottom up perspective. 
However, while the project focused attention on 
user group and community participation, the 
responsibilities and role of local government 
entities appears to have been insufficiently 
defined. The project included capacity building 
of some support organisations and service 
delivery agencies at the local level (WB 2013), 
but ultimately was hamstrung by the larger 
problem of centralisation of political power in 
Nepal (ICG 2011). Decentralisation could 
genuinely create an empowerment of people in 
rural areas, which is in line with the main goal of 
the Fund Board approach (Prasain 2003, Sharma 
2001).  Strengthening local government capacity 
in the water and sanitation sector would be an 
important step towards sustainable provision of 
public services in rural Nepal.  
 
2.5 Bolivia 
 
Under President Evo Morales Bolivia has 
witnessed significant shifts in the way the state is 
addressing the control and reduction of coca 
crops and the promotion of economic 
development in the country’s two main coca-
growing regions, Yungas de la Paz (YDP) in the 
highlands and Chapare in central Bolivia close to 
the city of Cochabamba. Upon taking office in 
January 2006, Morales moved quickly to 
distance his administration from the eradication-
focused and militarized US-supported counter-
drug policies pursued by previous Bolivian 
governments, which in his then capacity as head 
of the six Chapare coca growing federations and 
leader of the Movement toward Socialism 
(MAS) he had strongly opposed.9  Instead of 
                                               
9
 It is noteworthy that in 2004, under the short-lived 
government of President Carlos Mesa, Morales and the 
president reached agreement on tolerating the cultivation of 
one cato (1,600 square metres) of coca per family in Chapare. 
In effect, this agreement represents the origin of the social 
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focusing on the forced eradication of ‘excess’ 
and illegal coca crops and the conditional 
promotion of alternative development in coca 
growing regions,10 the Morales government 
devised a strategy centred on the ‘social control’ 
of crops by farmers and coca grower federations.  
 
Social coca control is complemented by a law 
enforcement component to fight drug-trafficking 
and – incipiently, at least - state support for 
sustainable and equitable economic development 
in coca growing regions, including infrastructure 
improvements and the provision of basic services 
like education and health care (Farthing and 
Kohl 2012:489; Youngers and Walsh 2010: 23). 
In contrast to previous, notably US-sponsored 
alternative development programs in Bolivia, 
nowadays development projects in coca growing 
regions are not anymore being made contingent 
on the prior eradication of coca crops (Addicks, 
Huebner-Schmid and Cabieses  2010:43). 
Rather, the direction of travel has been toward 
‘development with coca’ (Farthing and Kohl 
2010: 205) and, one should add, ‘with coca 
farmers and their powerful federations’.       .        
 
This shift in policy on the coca issue has been 
part of a broader government agenda geared at 
strengthening the hand of Bolivia’s poor and 
indigenous populations; increasing public 
investment in social services and welfare 
provision in impoverished areas, including in 
rural hinterlands; asserting stronger control of 
the natural gas and mining industries vis-a-vis 
the transnational corporations operating in the 
country; and writing a new constitution 
establishing the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
and granting enhanced autonomies and rights to 
indigenous and marginalized populations, among 
others.  
 
As examined in Study 1, the design and 
implementation of this broad pro-poor, pro-
indigenous and pro-coca agenda was met with 
                                                                 
coca control policy that is being implemented since Morales 
took office in 2006.     
10
 According to Law 1008 of 1988, which is still in effect 
today (see below), there are three types of coca growing 
regions in Bolivia. One region in YDP where 12,000 hectares 
of coca can be grown legally for traditional, cultural and 
medicinal purposes; one region in Chapare where ‘excess’ 
coca is grown and which is categorized as a region ‘in 
transition’, with the ultimate aim being to end all coca 
growing there and achieve the switch of coca farmers to 
cultivating licit crops by means of ‘alternative development’ 
projects conditioned on the prior eradication of coca crops; 
and other areas in the country where coca is gown and which 
is deemed illegal and subject to eradication. 
significant resistance from Bolivia’s traditional 
elites and other constituencies that did not side 
with MAS, especially in the eastern and southern 
lowlands. It was also hamstrung and tested by 
the administrative inexperience of the Morales 
government, the general and historic weakness of 
Bolivia’s state institutions, including a weak rule 
of law, increasing drug-trafficking activity in the 
country, and the sheer magnitude of poverty and 
socioeconomic inequality among majority 
sectors of the population.  
 
Adding to this difficult context, the Morales 
administration’s approach to addressing the coca 
issue has lacked a legal foundation. Law 1008 of 
1988 - which stipulates that a maximum of 
12,000 hectares of coca for cultural, traditional 
and medicinal purposes may be grown on small 
plots in delimited areas in YDP and Cochabamba 
province, while all other coca is either 
considered to be ‘in excess’ (Chapare) or illegal 
(all areas other than Chapare and YDP) and 
therefore subject to different modes of 
eradication - is still in effect; and the 
government’s cato policy (see below) essentially 
reflects its political and pragmatic decision to 
tolerate coca cultivation while working with 
farmers and their federations to control its spread 
and diversion to drug-trafficking. As will be 
discussed below, government efforts to foment 
economic development in coca growing regions 
have been up against a number of big challenges. 
However, it is important to recognize that since 
the mid-2000s public investment in 
infrastructure and economic development as well 
as social welfare has increased, in part due to a 
substantial rise in public revenue from 
hydrocarbon exports (selling at higher 
international prices), and the state has made 
some progress in extending its reach across the 
country and into rural areas (Visioni and Moore 
2011: 33).   
 
The government’s flagship program for 
addressing coca leaf production and its control 
has been the ‘Programa de apoyo al control 
social de la producción de hoja de coca’ (Support 
for Social Control of the Production of Coca 
Leaf Program – PACS). PACS is implemented 
by the national government together with the 
regional coca grower federations in the Chapare 
and YDP. The European Commission (EC) has 
contributed EUR 10 million and the Bolivian 
government some EUR 2 million. Operational 
since 2009, the program’s overarching aim is to 
‘regulate the production of coca leaf in the 
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country through mechanisms of social control in 
an environment of peace, consultation, 
participation, democracy and full respect for 
human rights’ (PACS s.d.). PACS’s focus on 
farmer-led control of coca leaf production, 
voluntary eradication of crops that exceed a 
limited amount per family (one cato, which 
equals 1,600 m2), community-based monitoring 
of compliance and the coca grower federations’ 
central enforcement role represents a clear 
departure from previous crop reduction policies. 
‘The new approach reverses decades of U.S.-
financed policies focussed almost exclusively on 
military/police suppression and eradication that 
resulted in [...] human rights violations and 
harassment of the peasant farmers who grow 
coca leaf’ (Farthing and Kohl 2012: 489).   
 
PACS’s central components are a geographic 
information system (SYSCOCA) to monitor 
coca cultivation and compliance with the agreed 
cultivation limit of one cato per family; 
communications and diffusion of information 
about social control; institutional strengthening 
of coca producer organizations; provision of 
infrastructure, equipment and technical 
assistance to allow producer organizations to 
carry out social control; biometric registration of 
coca farmers; registration and titling of coca 
producers’ individual land; and increased 
interdiction of precursors, cocaine and other 
drugs (Youngers and Walsh 2010; Visioni and 
Moore 2011: 14-15). In essence, farmers are 
allowed to ‘grow a limited amount of coca to 
ensure some basic income, while working with 
coca grower federations and units of the security 
forces to voluntarily reduce overall coca 
production’ (Youngers and Walsh 2010: 23). 
This ‘cooperative coca reduction strategy’ 
(Ledebur and Youngers 2012: 5) is 
complemented by government projects to 
promote infrastructure and economic 
development in Bolivia’s coca growing regions 
with the overarching aim to strengthen 
livelihoods and institutions, guarantee food 
security and ‘improve the overall quality of life 
of the local population’ (Ledebur and Youngers 
2012:10).  
 
For the purpose of this study it is important to 
distinguish between the aims of PACS, which 
are quite narrowly focused on controlling the 
cultivation of coca in Chapare and YDP and 
essentially seek to contribute to the 
government’s drug policy goals, and the 
development aspects of government activity in 
rural areas in the main coca growing regions. 
However, we posit that there are important 
linkages between the two areas of policy that are 
worthwhile exploring in order to address the 
question of what works for development in rural 
contexts characterized not only by state 
weakness, poverty and underdevelopment, but 
also by the particular difficulty of being the site 
of an illicit rural economy with linkages to the 
illegal international drug business.             
 
Assessing the effects of ‘development with 
coca’ on rural livelihoods in Chapare 
 
Information and data on rural development in the 
Chapare is generally patchy and hard to come by. 
The difficulty of assessing the effect of PACS 
and complementary development projects in the 
region is further compounded by the absence of 
baseline data; and there are complex issues of 
attribution that cannot be resolved within the 
scope of this study. These limitations 
notwithstanding, based on a review of Bolivian 
government and donor documents, reports 
prepared by NGOs, academic studies and 
information made available by the principal EC 
PACS program officer it is possible to present an 
account that provides a broad-brush picture of a 
number of key advances and limitations with 
respect to rural development in the Chapare since 
the mid-2000s. 
 
Prior to the introduction of social coca control 
Chapare was the site of significant conflict and 
violence, involving the coca grower federations, 
the Bolivian state and its security forces, some 
international donors, and criminal drug-
trafficking organizations. Local opposition to 
forced coca crop eradication and US-led and 
sponsored counter-drug policies translated into a 
severe deterioration in state-citizen relations in 
the region, contributing to increases in state 
authority, legitimacy and capacity deficits and 
undermining the chances of success of 
alternative development programs conditioned 
on coca crop eradication, especially the large 
USAID programs. 
 
Since President Morales took office citizen-state 
relations in Chapare have improved significantly 
and conflict and violence have ceased almost 
entirely. This certainly is no small feat and 
should be seen as a key contribution to making 
development in the region possible and 
increasing its chances of success. In this vein, a 
2011 mid-term evaluation report of PACS states 
26 
 
that there are a number of development projects 
underway in Chapare, some with financial 
support from the EC (e.g. through National Fund 
for Alternative Development – FONADAL; 
Sector Budget Support Programme for the 
National Integrated Development Plan with Coca 
- PAPS), but if the government’s social coca 
control program were to fail these projects would 
be at risk too (Visioni and Moore 2011: 26). In 
other words, without strengthening the social 
control capacity of local coca farmers and 
federations, thereby providing them the 
opportunity to gain a relatively stable coca-based 
subsistence income, other development efforts in 
the region would likely not be successful and 
could run the risk of failing to achieve their 
goals. 
 
There are indications that the government’s cato 
policy has been relatively successful with respect 
to its specific goals, i.e. the control of coca leaf 
production (though not coca leaf diversion to 
drug-trafficking); it also seems to be having a 
positive effect not only on ensuring a relatively 
stable subsistence income for farmers, whose 
land has been titled, but also contributing to 
improved food security and allowing farmers to 
explore and invest in other income generating 
activities (Ledebur and Youngers 2012; Visioni 
and Moore 2011; Hansmann 2013). According to 
a senior EU cooperation official in La Paz, it is 
safe to assume that about 90 per cent of coca 
growing families in Chapare are at present 
complying with the cato limit (Hansmann 2013). 
Controlled and limited coca production has 
ensured a relatively high price for coca leaf; and 
farmers are enjoying more legal security due to 
the titling of their land as well as freedom from 
the repression that accompanied forced 
eradication in the past. It is estimated that a 
family generates approximately US$ 2,400/year 
of gross income from one cato of coca, which is 
slightly above the national minimum income, 
though production costs of approximately 30 per 
cent have to be deducted (Hansmann 2013; 
Visioni and Moore 2011: 16-17). Relatively 
secure income from the cato allows farmers to 
experiment with other income generating 
activities that are presently supported by 
complementary economic development programs 
funded by FONADAL and PAPS.  
 
The Morales government has reportedly been 
investing in social services and economic 
development to create jobs and foment higher 
incomes in the region; and it is providing 
incentives for rice and corn production as a way 
to both reduce coca production and improve food 
security (Youngers and Walsh 2010: 26, 29). In 
addition to loans to plant rice and corn, the 
government is providing funds to coca farmers to 
diversify their crops. In effect, according to the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
Chapare has witnessed not insignificant 
agricultural diversification since the mid-2000s 
(Ledebur and Youngers 2012: 10). In 2013, it 
was estimated that there are 25,000 hectares of 
banana plantations in the region, 12,000 hectares 
of palm heart and 5,000 hectares of pineapple. 
The area planted with coca has been reduced 
from some 9,500 hectares in 2009 to 
approximately 8,100 hectares in 2012 of which 
2,000 hectares are located in the adjacent 
national parks and not in Chapare itself 
(Hansmann 2013). This means that coca is today 
only the third largest agricultural crop in the 
region, after banana and palm heart (Ledebur and 
Youngers 2012: 10).  
 
In addition, banana exports to Argentina, where 
more than a million Bolivians live, have 
increased, farmers are investing more in new 
products like honey, coffee, chocolate and even 
cattle, and small scale businesses, such as 
marketing and transportation services, have 
multiplied (Ledebur and Youngers 2012: 10). It 
should be noted, however, that crop 
diversification in Chapare cannot solely be 
attributed to Bolivian government policy in the 
region. It goes back to a variety of bilateral and 
multilateral donor programs to support 
alternative development in Chapare in the 2000s, 
including programs financed by USAID, the 
Spanish cooperation agency and the EC 
(Hansmann 2013). 
 
There is a sense among observers that crop and 
income diversification appears to have increased 
local incomes and overall quality of life among 
Chapare’s farmers, though this impression is not 
backed by hard data (Ledebur and Youngers 
2012). What appears to be undeniable is that 
crop diversification and the generation of 
alternative livelihoods are facing similar 
problems today under the new scheme of social 
control than they did in the past when 
development support was conditioned on coca 
eradication.  
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Chapare is still suffering from a lack of roads, 
technical assistance and markets; and almost no 
other crop can compete with coca in terms of 
income, ease of cultivation, and transportation 
(Farthing and Kohl 2012: 492). According to one 
estimate, some 60 per cent of coca leaf produced 
in the region is sold to criminal organizations 
linked into the illegal drug business (Visioni and 
Moore 2011). Further, pressures from farmers to 
expand the area of permitted coca are intense. 
Farmers complain that they cannot support their 
families solely on income from one cato 
(Farthing and Kohl 2012: 492). Long term 
success is not guaranteed but depends on 
economic development that includes expanding 
licit coca markets, diversifying agricultural 
production and improving rural infrastructure. 
An integrated multi-sector program for rural 
development in Chapare remains inexistent, in 
spite of the government’s high-flying plans for 
‘integrated development with coca’.  
 
In effect, PACS was originally supposed to be 
supported by an infrastructure program, but thus 
far this has not materialized; the program is 
insufficiently linked to, and coordinated with, 
development projects supported by FONADAL 
and PAPS. The latter difficulty is compounded 
by dysfunctional coordination and bureaucratic 
rivalries as well as diverging mandates with 
respect to the coca issue between two key 
involved state institutions, the Ministry of Rural 
Development and Land (Vice-ministry of Coca 
and Integrated Development) and the Interior 
Ministry (Vice-ministry of Social Defence). 
While the former focuses on issues related to 
development and governance in rural and coca-
growing areas, the latter is above all concerned 
with achieving a reduction in coca crops through 
social control in accordance with the Morales 
administration’s strategy to combat drug-
trafficking (Visioni and Moore 2011: 16, 35).    
 
Explaining advances in, and limitations of, 
‘development with coca’ in Chapare  
 
The crux of the matter appears to be that strong 
social organizations and coca farmer federations 
at the local and regional levels command 
significant authority and legitimacy, as well as 
the capacity to exert pressure on, and enforce 
compliance with the cato policy among, coca 
farmers. A close, almost organic relationship 
between Chapare farmers and the national 
government and fluid collaboration between the 
latter and local communities and organizations 
have been key factors for the relative success of 
PACS in terms of controlling and reducing coca 
crops in the region. The departure from the 
eradication-focused, militarized and top-down 
governance of coca crop reduction that existed 
prior to the mid-2000s and the creation of a new 
form of governance based on a negotiated, 
consensual approach as well as strong local 
ownership of, and participation of cocalero 
communities and federations in, exercising 
control over the cultivation of coca brought an 
important measure of social peace and a 
reduction of conflict and violence to the region. 
  
Arguably, the significant improvement in state-
farmer/federation relations, the cessation of 
violent conflict over the coca issue and respect 
for human rights are necessary, if not sufficient, 
conditions for equitable and sustainable 
development in Chapare. This is reflected in the 
fact that agricultural crop and income 
diversification in the region has advanced, 
though there clearly are still significant 
limitations in this regard. Road infrastructure, 
markets and other agricultural and social services 
are in much need of being developed further. 
Income from crops and labour in the agricultural 
sector (on and off-farm) appear to have increased 
but there is a clear need for further expansion. 
Coca farmers and their families are acutely 
aware that they cannot subsist on one cato of 
coca alone, and that they need support from the 
central government for the generation of non-
coca income. Although the Morales 
administration has devised two comprehensive 
plans for ‘integrated development with coca’ 
(Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural, Agropecuario y 
Medio Ambiente 2006; Ministerio de Desarrollo 
Rural y Tierras 2010), funding for development 
projects remains limited and is slow in 
forthcoming, and implementation is 
consequently lagging.  
 
Further, the government has yet to make 
headway with expanding alternative licit uses of 
coca and advancing the industrialization of the 
coca leaf. Lacking coordination and bureaucratic 
rivalries between key state institutions mandated 
with fomenting rural development and 
overseeing social coca crop control and 
reduction has produced a situation in which the 
gains made on the coca control front and the 
‘pacification’ of Chapare are not capitalized on 
sufficiently to advance equitable and sustainable 
development in the region. This represents 
nothing short of a huge lost opportunity and the 
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Bolivian government and its international 
partners should swiftly seek to remedy this 
situation. Such an effort will necessarily have to 
include creating a legislative and normative 
framework for social control of coca crops that 
applies across the country (Addicks, Huebner-
Schmid and Cabieses 2010). Such a framework 
does not yet exist; Law 1008 is still in effect and 
social control of coca crops is part of political 
strategy and based on a concession by the 
government vis-a-vis coca farmers and their 
federations in Chapare and YDP. For it to make 
a lasting contribution to development in 
Bolivia’s coca growing regions Morales’s cato 
and social control policy requires a legal 
foundation.      
 
 
3. By way of conclusion: 
comparing rural development 
advances in fragile settings 
 
 
In this study we have provided detailed accounts 
and assessments of rural development 
interventions in the period 2007-2012 in our five 
sample countries: Afghanistan, DRC, Yemen, 
Nepal and Bolivia. The selected projects and 
programs represent a range of interventions in 
terms of their aims, sector specificity, size, 
duration, the political, social and security 
contexts, and the domestic actors and 
international donors involved in their design and 
implementation. As such, they represent a 
spectrum of variation with respect to the central 
question of this study - that is, what works for 
rural development in fragile contexts - and can 
be usefully employed to arrive at the following 
comparative conclusions.       
 
In assessing the merits of the various projects 
and programs it becomes apparent that 
substantial engagement and dialogue with local 
institutions and stakeholders, including 
traditional and customary ones, in project design 
and implementation is essential for achieving 
project goals in fragile settings. This helps 
address the state capacity and legitimacy deficits 
identified in Study I. We essentially concur with 
Pain and Sutton (2007) that ‘more attention 
needs to be paid to connecting relief to 
agricultural rehabilitation and development 
through agricultural interventions which can 
only be enhanced through building up the 
capacities of, and relations between, key local,  
 
 
NGO and state institutions, particularly those 
providing, facilitating, regulating and demanding 
agricultural services’ (Pain and Sutton 2007: 
186).  
 
While formal and informal institutions at the 
local and regional levels matter a great deal for 
strengthening rural livelihoods, increasing and 
diversifying rural incomes as well as ensuring 
food security and addressing issues related to 
illicit rural economies,11 due attention also needs 
to be paid to problems that might arise from the 
‘capture’ of rural development projects by 
exclusionary or predatory interests that can be 
associated with informal, traditional and 
customary institutions. The cases of Afghanistan, 
DRC and Yemen show that this is a real risk. A 
focus on local institutions is laden with 
difficulties and uncertainties where informal, 
traditional and customary power-holders (which 
might include militia commanders and war lords 
with often violent agendas), are able to exercise 
comparatively unaccountable control. If these 
risks are not managed properly they can 
undermine state legitimacy. 
                                               
11
 In this study we have analysed the challenges of rural 
development in the illicit drugs context in the Chapare region 
of Bolivia. Another case would be the illicit opium poppy 
economy in several regions of Afghanistan.  
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Yet international donors will have to assume and 
navigate this risk carefully because in the 
absence of a more effective and legitimate 
central and formal state and in the context of 
emergency and crisis situations there are no 
ready alternatives to working closely with local 
counterparts and institutions, including 
traditional and customary ones. The evidence 
shows that the establishment of ‘modern’ forms 
of local governance, such as CDCs in 
Afghanistan and SDCs in Yemen, through 
elections can help to strengthen demand for rural 
development and food security projects among 
the target populations and thereby increase a 
sense of ownership among them. However, there 
is clearly also the risk that these newly 
introduced forms of local governance are not 
fully representative (or indeed just a reflection 
of, and captured by, the existing traditional and 
customary institutions and powerholders), 
sustainable, and able to galvanize collective 
action among a broad range local stakeholders 
that would address difficult and contested issues, 
such as access to land, water and markets.      
 
For both donors and governments alike this 
necessitates something of a ‘working with the 
grain’ reorientation because of the lack of viable 
alternatives, where a greater emphasis is placed 
on local interaction and a multi-level 
governance-oriented approach rather than seeing 
the state, especially at the central level, as the 
principle agent and counterpart. The Yemen case 
discussed in the study bears this out, for instance. 
The evidence indicates that the highly fragile 
formal state coexists alongside intricate and 
arguably much stronger and more legitimate 
patronage networks which are structured along 
ethnic, tribal, religious and political lines. The 
difficulty is that such interventions become far 
too localised in nature and are clearly limited in 
addressing macro-level issues (as outlined in the 
NFSS), with serious questions also remaining 
about their sustainability.   
 
It also seems clear that an agricultural-
technologies-input-only approach, i.e. the ‘seed 
and tools’ interventions discussed in relation to 
Afghanistan, is likely to simply consolidate 
existing relationships of power and patronage 
where benefits will be accrued and captured 
mainly by local elites. The Afghanistan example 
shows food security improvements were only 
made possible by investing in these institutional 
relationships through initial dialogue, the 
instigation of improved production techniques, 
and then through focusing on the marketing 
networks of the poorest households via these 
institutions. Our discussion of the Nepal case 
also underlines the importance of focusing 
interventions on the most vulnerable households, 
including those that form part of lower castes 
and indigenous peoples but also women and 
populations living in very remote areas. This 
helps address existing state capacity and 
legitimacy deficits. Moreover, a key goal of 
interventions in fragile settings should be to 
provide effective support for the diversification 
of the income of rural families because in many 
instances the rural poor do not have access to 
land or legally own land. This can contribute to 
tackling pervasive rural poverty and reducing 
historical social inequalities between rural and 
urban areas, which are conditioned by, and 
related to, deficits in state authority and capacity, 
and which are undermine state legitimacy.   
 
Depending on the specific country 
circumstances, our analysis shows that in 
situations of acute emergency, food insecurity 
and humanitarian crisis it may be advisable to 
transition more development-focused 
interventions in rural areas to emergency and 
relief programming. The case of Yemen reveals 
that in such situations ‘doing less and doing it 
quickly is doing more’. However, policy-makers 
need to be aware that emergency measures such 
as the Cash-for-Work projects in Yemen can 
have some positive and even longer-term effects 
on rural development in food insecure settings 
(basically through the provision and 
rehabilitation of physical rehabilitation in the 
intervention areas) but ultimately bypassing the 
(inoperative and/or overwhelmed) central 
government and state is not an effective long-
term policy option as it ultimately would 
contribute to increasing deficits in state 
legitimacy and capacity. In this regard it cannot 
be overstated that rural development is a long-
term process, as exemplified by the discussed 
rural water and sanitation programs in Nepal.           
 
The right type of communicative environment 
and strategies is born out in several of our cases. 
An emphasis on fostering networks of dialogue 
and communication which build on emerging 
pro-poor social and political capital also needs to 
be viewed in conjunction with a stronger 
emphasis on participatory learning and more 
flexible project timescales. Both the Nepal and 
DRC examples discussed here illustrate this. The 
Nepal rural water and sanitation program, which 
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adopted a learning process approach, was 
flexible in its planning modalities and it 
supported community empowerment from a 
bottom up perspective. However, while the 
program focused attention on user group and 
community participation (which seems to have 
led to some positive results and outcomes) there 
have been problems with defining the role of 
local government, leading to serious questions 
over the quality of decentralisation in Nepal and 
the state’s capacity more broadly. A similar 
theme is evident in the DRC. Here the 
livelihoods and rehabilitation project did its best 
to foster dialogue with all relevant stakeholders, 
paying particular attention to problems of social 
cohesion. However, the project recognisedp/. 
that the three year timescale of the project was 
too short, not allowing for a more flexible 
approach particularly given the destabilising 
nature of the conflict in the Kivu region. 
 
In respect to rural development in illicit drugs 
contexts, the Bolivian coca farming case shows 
that relative, though to some degree mixed 
progress has been achieved through building on 
the newly enhanced political and social capital of 
indigenous farmer federations who command 
significant authority and legitimacy at both the 
local and regional level. As we have indicated, 
the fluid collaboration between Chapare farmers 
and national and local government has been key 
to the achieving PACS’s goals in terms of 
controlling and reducing coca crops in the 
region. In essence, this has meant a change from 
the eradication-focused, militarized and top-
down governance of coca crop reduction that had 
existed prior to the mid-2000s, creating a new 
form of governance based on a negotiated, 
consensual approach with strong local ownership 
of, and participation of, cocalero communities 
and federations in exerting control over the 
cultivation of coca. This helped enable an 
environment through which social peace and the 
reduction of conflict and violence could be 
fomented in the region. However, the social 
control of coca crops appears to be a necessary 
but on its own insufficient condition to 
strengthen rural development in the Chapare. 
While agricultural crop and income 
diversification has advanced, significant 
limitations persist in this regard. Road 
infrastructure, markets and other agricultural and 
social services need to be developed further.     
 
Finally, our analysis shows that it is important to 
reiterate what has already been said many times 
before: the overall institutional, political, security 
and infrastructure context matters for rural 
development in fragile settings. Unsurprisingly, 
the chances to strengthen rural livelihoods and 
increase and diversify agricultural production 
and rural income are higher in contexts where 
rural populations are less exposed to security 
threats (by the state and non-state armed actors, 
but sometimes also international intervention 
forces), where there is better physical 
infrastructure and access to markets, where the 
fundamental rights of rural citizens are better 
protected, and where political instability or 
deadlock at the national level does not 
undermine development prospects in rural areas. 
While rural development interventions cannot 
change the broader environment in which they 
are operating, they can and should adjust to the 
context and contribute to reducing deficits in 
state legitimacy and capacity in rural areas, as 
outlined above.  
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